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Narkeeta I - History

Narkeeta I - History



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Narkeeta I
(Steam tug #3: dp. 192, 1. 92'6", b. 21'; dr. 8' (mean); s.
11.5 k.; cpl. 9; cl. Wahneta)

The first ,Varkeeta, steam tug #3, was laid down in April 1891 by the City Point Iron Works, Boston, Mass., Launched 11 February 1892; accepted by the Navy at the Navy Yard, Boston, 12 March 1892; and commissioned 14 April 1892.

Narkeeta, a two massed steel tug served the Navy, performing seemingly mundane, but ali important, towing and tugging services, until 1923. Operating primarily in the New York area, she aided in the efficient movement of larger vessels in and out of that congested port during two wars, the Spanish-American War and World War I. Decommissioned in April 1923, she remained at New York until sold, 28 October 1926, to Joseph F. O'Boyle.


NARKEETA TIMBER COMPANY INC v. JENKINS

NARKEETA TIMBER COMPANY, INC. and Lavon McCallum v. Velma JENKINS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Floyzell Hill, Johnny Mosley and Fannie Mosley.

No. 1999-CA-01099-SCT.

Decided: November 30, 2000

¶ 1. Narkeeta Timber Co., Inc. and Lavon McCallum ask this Court to hold as a matter of first impression that under Mississippi's tortfeasor liability apportionment statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7 (1999), the collective joint and several liability of all defendants contributing to a loss is fifty percent. In other words, Narkeeta and McCallum contend that the statute does not authorize a prevailing plaintiff to recover fifty percent of his award from each defendant. We agree with this reading of this statute and therefore reverse and render.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

¶ 2. On January 3, 1995, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Floyzell Hill was driving a 1988 Chevrolet truck southbound on U.S. Highway 45 in Noxubee County. Fannie Mosley and her son Johnny Mosley, two of the appellees herein, were passengers in Hill's truck. Lavon McCallum, while in the course and scope of his employment with Narkeeta Timber Company, Inc., was driving a tractor owned by Waters International Truck, pulling a loaded log pole trailer in the northbound lane on Highway 45. Approximately twenty-five miles south of the accident scene, McCallum discovered that an electrical shortage had caused his tail lights to fail so he drove with his hazard lights flashing en route to the Weyerhaeuser plant in Columbus. Theron Koehn, another defendant in this case, was stopped in his truck at the intersection of Old Macon Road and Highway 45 waiting to turn north onto Highway 45. Koehn testified that he observed the tractor trailer driven by McCallum decreasing speed and flashing what he mistakenly concluded as a turn signal in an apparent attempt to turn off of Highway 45 and onto Old Macon Road. Under this erroneous assumption, Koehn turned his pickup truck from Old Macon Road onto Highway 45. Unfortunately, McCallum continued through the intersection and collided with the rear-end of Koehn's truck, the force of which propelled Koehn's truck into the southbound lane of Highway 45 and directly into Hill's truck. As a result of the collision, the Mosleys suffered multiple injuries, and Hill died several days later at a nearby hospital.

¶ 3. After the accident, three separate suits were filed, one for each of the occupants of Hill's truck. Velma Jenkins is the personal representative of the estate of Hill and an appellee herein. Koehn, Narkeeta, and McCallum were the defendants in each of the three cases below. Prior to trial, the cases were consolidated and tried to a verdict. The jury found in favor of each of the plaintiffs.

¶ 4. The jury awarded $1,500,000 to Hill's estate, $500,000 to Johnny Mosley, and $51,066 to Fannie Mosley. The total jury award in favor of the plaintiffs and against each of the defendants is $2,051,066. The jury responded to special interrogatories and determined that Koehn was eighty percent (80%) at fault and that Narkeeta, by virtue of its employee McCallum, was twenty percent (20%) at fault for the plaintiffs' injuries and damages. On September 17, 1997, the final judgments were entered and filed with the circuit court. The verdicts and the total monetary award remain undisturbed and are not at issue in this appeal. Motions for JNOV, or in the alternative, for a new trial and remittitur were denied. On January 30, 1998, Narkeeta filed a motion to authorize the circuit clerk to cancel judgments against McCallum and Narkeeta. After a hearing on the matter, the Noxubee County Circuit Court entered a memorandum opinion and order wherein it denied Narkeeta's and McCallum's motion to authorize the circuit clerk to cancel judgments against them.

¶ 5. On June 18, 1999, Narkeeta and McCallum filed their notice of appeal. The current issue involves payment of the judgment. Narkeeta and McCallum have paid $925,533 and now seek to have the judgment against them dismissed as satisfied, arguing that the payment by them, coupled with a $100,000 payment by Koehn, relieves them of any further obligation to the Mosleys and Jenkins pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7. Specifically, Narkeeta and McCallum argue that:

THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY REQUIRING McCALLUM AND NARKEETA TO PAY AN ADDITIONAL $ 100,000 OVER THE $ 925,533 ALREADY PAID SINCE THE RESULT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO HOLDING THESE DEFENDANTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE TO SUCH AN EXTENT AS TO ALLOW THE PLAINTIFFS TO RECOVER MORE THAN 50% OF THEIR RECOVERABLE DAMAGES UNDER MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(2).

¶ 6. We review questions of law de novo. Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 735 So.2d 161, 165 ¶ 7 (Miss.1999). Therefore, we are not required to defer to the trial court's order that denied Narkeeta and McCallum's motion to cancel the judgment.

¶ 7. Both sides assert that this is an issue of first impression whereupon we are asked to interpret Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7. If the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, then construction is superfluous and will not be allowed:

The primary rule of construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the statute as a whole and from the language used therein. Where the statute is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction, but where it is ambiguous the court, in determining the legislative intent, may look not only to the language used but also to its historical background, its subject matter, and the purposes and objects to be accomplished. Finally all presumptions and intendments must be indulged in favor of the validity of a statute, and its unconstitutionality must appear beyond a reasonable doubt before it will be declared invalid.

Clark v. State ex rel. Miss. State Med. Ass'n, 381 So.2d 1046, 1048 (Miss.1980).

¶ 8. The statute at issue in this case is Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7, which states in pertinent part that:

(2) [I]n any civil action based on fault, the liability for damages caused by two (2) or more persons shall be joint and several only to the extent necessary for the person suffering injury, death or loss to recover fifty percent (50%) of his recoverable damages.

(3) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (2) and (6) of this section, in any civil action based on fault, the liability for damages caused by two (2) or more persons shall be several only, and not joint and several and a joint tort-feasor shall be liable only for the amount of damages allocated to him in direct proportion to his percentage of fault. In assessing percentages of fault an employer and the employer's employee or a principal and the principal's agent shall be considered as one (1) defendant when the liability of such employer or principal has been caused by the wrongful or negligent act or omission of the employee or agent.

(4) Any defendant held jointly liable under this section shall have a right of contribution against fellow joint tort-feasors. A defendant shall be held responsible for contribution to other joint tort-feasors only for the percentage of fault assessed to such defendant.

Evolution of Joint and Several Liability

¶ 9. Mississippi follows joint and several liability which is a method of determining loss apportionment between the plaintiff and multiple tortfeasors. In 1910, Mississippi adopted a pure comparative negligence standard, but in 1952, tortfeasors gained a limited right of contribution among themselves if all of the tortfeasors were named as defendants and none settled before a joint judgment was rendered. H. Wesley Williams, III, 1989 Tort “Reform” in Mississippi: Modification of Joint and Several Liability and the Adoption of Comparative Contribution, 13 Miss. C.L.Rev. 133, 151 (1992). In order to cure the problem of lack of contribution between joint tortfeasors, Mississippi instituted a third-party practice under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 14. However, the usefulness of Rule 14 was greatly diminished if a joint tortfeasor had no substantive right of contribution such as the derivative or secondary liability of the third-party defendant to the third-party plaintiff. Miss. R. Civ. P. 14 cmt. In summary, prior to 1989, plaintiffs had the option to sue one, all or a select group of tortfeasors and collect full damages from those parties sued. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 879 (Miss.1985). Plaintiffs could recover the entire amount of the award from any single tortfeasor, no matter the allocation of fault. Id.

¶ 10. On July 1, 1989, the Legislature enacted Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7 (1999) wherein it modified the previous rule of law with regard to the amount of damages for which a tortfeasor could be held responsible. Under the old system, we had joint and several liability up to 100% of the judgment. Contrary to the statement of the Court in Hunter, § 85-5-7 does not abolish joint and several liability for up to 50% of the plaintiff's injuries and replace it with several liability. Estate of Hunter v. General Motors Corp., 729 So.2d 1264, 1274 (Miss.1999). Rather, § 85-5-7, by its express language, abolishes joint and several liability over 50% of the judgment and leaves untouched joint and several liability up to 50% of the judgment.

Application to the Instant Case

¶ 11. Narkeeta has conceded that, had Koehn not paid a dime, it would have been forced to pay 50% of the judgment according to the statute. For example, Narkeeta would have been severally liable up to 50% of the judgment. This is consistent with the language of the statute. However, the statute also states that liability for the 50% is not merely several, but joint and several. Here, Koehn has already paid $100,000. If the 50% liability is truly joint, meaning shared between tortfeasors, Koehn and Narkeeta share liability for up to 50% of the judgment. Applying this reasoning, if two parties owe something together, the fact that one party paid a portion of it necessarily decreases the amount owed by the other. If we were to force Narkeeta to pay 50% regardless of what Koehn paid, we would render meaningless the term “joint and several” and be left merely with several liability.

¶ 12. Narkeeta and McCallum have paid $925,533 of the judgment and Koehn has paid $100,000. This brings the total amount paid to $1,025,533. This is exactly 50% of the $2,051,066 judgment against the defendants. Implementing the statute here, these defendants are jointly and severally liable for up to 50% of the judgment. Therefore, Narkeeta and McCallum have satisfied the judgment against them because 50% of the total judgment has been paid to the plaintiffs. Therefore, they are released from any further obligation to the Mosleys and Jenkins pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7.

¶ 13. After reviewing the facts of this case and the applicable law, we find that the circuit court did err as a matter of law in dismissing Narkeeta's and McCallum's motion to cancel the judgments against them. For these reasons, we reverse the judgment denying Narkeeta's and McCallum's motion to authorize the circuit clerk to cancel the judgments against them, and we render judgment here that the judgments against McCallum and Narkeeta are satisfied and canceled.

¶ 15. Believing that the majority's interpretation of the statute runs afoul of established judicial precedent, firm public policy and the Legislature's intent in enacting the statute, I respectfully dissent. The aim of tort law is to protect the rights and privileges of persons against wrongful acts by others and restore an injured party to as good a position as he held prior to the tort. 86 C.J.S. Torts § 2, at 625-26 (1997). Any judicial or legislative decision concerning tort liability requires a balancing of competing interests and a policy decision as to which party should bear the risks of an immune or insolvent tortfeasor. Id. at 627.

¶ 16. Narkeeta is essentially trying to use Koehn's payment as if it were a settlement in order to lower its proportionate share of responsibility for the joint judgment, asking this Court to make a policy decision that the victim bear the brunt of the largely insolvent Koehn. Through the majority's interpretation, the tortfeasors avoid suffering the consequences of their actions to the tune of $100,000 money owed to the innocent victims that they will never see. I do not believe that the Legislature intended the statute to allow one tortfeasor to use the payment of another as a windfall, thus depriving the injured party a more complete recovery. I believe that the majority's holding will result in an interpretation of the statute that functions in conflict with the basic precepts of tort law, and ultimately the public interest.

¶ 17. As noted in the majority's opinion, Mississippi follows the joint and several liability theory in determining loss apportionment between tortfeasors. The statute at issue, Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7 (1999), altered the rule of apportionment to allow two or more tortfeasors to stand trial and have a jury award entered against them without the fear of being responsible for the entire amount of the award. Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7(2). Additionally, the statute caps a tortfeasor's payment responsibility at fifty percent of the recoverable damages if the tortfeasor's proportionate fault is fifty percent or less. Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7(3). Under subsection (3), Narkeeta and McCallum are considered one defendant for purposes of liability. It is important to remember that the statute does not limit plaintiffs to fifty percent recovery. Instead, it limits the payment by each tortfeasor against whom a joint judgment is rendered to fifty percent of the total verdict. Furthermore:

The principal effect of § 85-5-7 is that it abolishes joint and several liability for up to 50 % of the plaintiff's injuries and replaces it with a several liability up to this amount. Thus, the statute serves to reduce the extent to which one defendant may be held liable for the negligence of another.

Estate of Hunter v. General Motors Corp., 729 So.2d 1264 (¶ 35) (Miss.1999).

¶ 18. Narkeeta urges this Court to interpret Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7 to hold that the collective joint and several liability of all defendants contributing to the loss is fifty percent instead of each party being held individually responsible for fifty percent of the judgment. Narkeeta supports this position by emphasizing that the statute does not clearly state that a plaintiff is entitled to fifty percent from each defendant.

¶ 19. A definitive understanding of the terms “several liability” and “joint and several liability” is necessary before delving further into the argument. “Several liability” is liability that is separate and distinct from liability of another to the extent that an independent action may be brought without joinder of others. “Joint and several liability,” on the other hand, describes the liability that an individual or business either shares with other tortfeasors or bears individually without the others.

¶ 20. Although this is the first opportunity for this Court to interpret the language of our apportionment statute, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a case not cited by either side in this appeal, ventured an “Erie-guess” as to how we would decide a similar issue. Krieser v. Hobbs, 166 F.3d 736, 739 (5th Cir.1999) see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Krieser questioned whether a non-settling defendant was entitled to a pro-tanto credit for a settlement amount tendered by a joint tortfeasor. Krieser, 166 F.3d at 745. Although distinguishable from the case at bar, the reasoning behind the Krieser decision is sound and wholly applicable. The Krieser court relied heavily upon language found in McBride v. Chevron U.S.A., 673 So.2d 372, 380 (Miss.1996), which did not apply § 85-5-7 because the incident occurred before the statute's effective date, where this Court considered both the settlement-first and the fault-first methods of verdict reduction. Id. In trying to ascertain the fairest method of verdict reduction in cases where a jury returns a verdict against a tortfeasor after a codefendant joint tortfeasor settles, we held that “a defendant whose negligence proximately caused injury to another person should not be allowed to escape liability for his negligence by the fortuity that a co-defendant has settled prior to trial.” Id.

¶ 21. In this case, neither defendant settled, however, Koehn paid the limits of his insurance immediately after trial. This ideal-that plaintiffs should not be denied recovery where one of the tortfeasors settles before the end of trial-is instructive in articulating the public policy issue before us today. The public policy underlying this issue in Mississippi was best explained in Pruett v. City of Rosedale, when this Court said:

One of the paramount interests of the members of an organized and civilized society is that they be afforded protection against harm to their persons, properties, and characters. The logical extension of that interest is that, if harm is wrongfully inflicted upon an individual in such a society, he should have an opportunity to obtain a reasonable and adequate remedy against the wrongdoer, either to undo the harm inflicted or to provide compensation therefor. If the state is properly to serve the public interest, it must strive, through its laws, to achieve the goals of protecting the people and of providing them with adequate remedies for injuries wrongfully inflicted upon them. So long as the state fails to do so, it will be functioning in conflict with the public interest and the public good.

Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So.2d 1046, 1048-49 (Miss.1982)(quoting Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 235 N.W.2d 597, 602-03 (1975)). Here, the jury found Narkeeta to be twenty percent liable. Therefore, Narkeeta's assertion that it is severally liable to the plaintiffs for twenty percent or $410,213.20 of the joint judgment is correct under subsection (3) which is the amount of damages allocated to it in direct proportion to its percentage of fault. However, recovery under the statute is not limited to subsection (3). Narkeeta is also liable to the plaintiffs for fifty percent of the recoverable damages or $1,025,533 under subsection (2). Again, we must remember that the statute does not cap a plaintiff's total recovery to fifty percent of the judgment. It simply caps the payment of each judgment debtor to fifty percent of the total verdict.

¶ 22. Narkeeta argues that § 85-5-7(4), which allows for contribution between tortfeasors who share a joint judgment burden, is an inadequate remedy for the less culpable defendant. The crux of Narkeeta's argument against relying on this section for less culpable tortfeasors to recover payments on joint judgments over and above their proportionate share of liability is that the more culpable codefendant is most likely insolvent (otherwise the plaintiff would have pursued a claim for recovery against this codefendant), and therefore, the less culpable codefendant who paid more than its proportionate share would have a worthless claim of contribution against the more culpable co-defendant. While this subsection may not always be helpful in obtaining contribution from codefendants, the Legislature enacted it to cure the historical problem of no contribution.

¶ 23. After reviewing the facts of this case and the applicable law, I believe that the circuit court did not err as a matter of law in denying Narkeeta's and McCallum's motion to cancel the judgments against them. Each defendant against whom a joint judgment is rendered is responsible for up to fifty percent of the judgment despite its proportionate liability. If its proportionate share is less than fifty percent, such as the case here, then a defendant who has paid more than its proportionate share of the joint judgment may seek contribution against a tortfeasor with whom it shares a joint judgment. Better the tortfeasors fight one another for the disproportionate share in contribution rights than prevent the innocent victim from recovering as much of his judgment as is possible. For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.


From Our Archive: The steel ocean tug Narkeeta (YT-3)

Construction methods for building the steel ocean tug Narkeeta (YT-3) in 1892 did not deviate from standards as this photograph may imply. The tug's brickwork was not a test of non-strategic materials construction but rather an experimental camouflage scheme. Black stripes on the white background produced a soft gray effect at moderate distances. Larger black patches were applied to those areas which usually reflected light. Visibility of the ship was reduced when the light was behind the observer. Why didn't they just paint her light gray?

This and other photographs are available as prints through the Naval Institute Photo Archive. You may place orders or leave messages 24 hours a day at 1-800-233-8764, contact [email protected] , or visit our Web site,


Narkeeta I - History

USS Hancock , an 8500 ton (displacement) transport, was built at Glasgow, Scotland, in 1879 as the commercial steamship Arizona . She was purchased by the U.S. War Department during the Spanish-American War of 1898 and served as an Army Transport until November 1902, when she was transferred to the Navy. Placed in commission later in that month, Hancock steamed around South America from California to New York, and was decommissioned in March 1903. Following conversion work, she was recommissioned in September to begin nearly a decade as the New York Navy Yard's Receiving Ship.

In September 1913 Hancock left New York for Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to be prepared for seagoing transport duty. In 1914 she carried Marines to and from Mexico and supported operations in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The ship continued to serve in the Caribbean area for the next few years. Among the services she performed was carrying men and material from the armored cruiser Memphis , which had been wrecked at Santo Domingo in August 1916. In March 1917 Hancock was present as the United States took possession of the Virgin Islands.

When the United States entered the First World War in April 1917, Hancock seized two German merchantmen interned in the Virgin Islands. In May she took possession of two more at San Juan, Puerto Rico, towing one of them to the Philadelphia Navy Yard. Her next assignment, during June and July 1917, was to take U.S. servicemen across the Atlantic to France. Following completion of that mission Hancock resumed her service in the West Indies and Gulf of Mexico region. In April-August 1920 she steamed to Scotland with Sailors who were to man the ex-German battleship Ostfriesland and cruiser Frankfurt during their voyages to the United States. When the Navy implemented its alpha-numeric hull number system in July 1920 she was designated AP-3.

Following some months of further transport service between the U.S. East Coast and the West Indies, and a trip through the Panama Canal to San Francisco, California, in May 1921 Hancock went to the Hawaiian Islands to become the Receiving Ship at Pearl Harbor. She was employed in this stationary duty for four years, at some point receiving the designation IX-12, then returned to California under tow in July 1925. Decommissioned at the beginning of September 1925, USS Hancock was sold in May 1926.

This page features, and provides links to all the views we have concerning USS Hancock (1902-1926, later AP-3 and IX-12).

If you want higher resolution reproductions than the digital images presented here, see: "How to Obtain Photographic Reproductions."

Click on the small photograph to prompt a larger view of the same image.

USS Hancock (1902-1926, later AP-3)

Off the Mare Island Navy Yard, California, during the early 1900s.

Courtesy of Donald M. McPherson, 1976.

U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph.

Online Image: 74KB 740 x 600 pixels

USS Hancock (1902-1926, later AP-3)

Off the Mare Island Navy Yard, California, during the early 1900s.

Courtesy of Donald M. McPherson, 1976.

U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph.

Online Image: 86KB 740 x 590 pixels

USS Hancock (1902-1926, later AP-3), at left

Tied up at the New York Navy Yard, Brooklyn, New York, circa May 1908, while serving as Receiving Ship there.
Tug Narkeeta (Steam Tug # 3, later YT-3) is passing by in the right foreground.
Beyond Hancock is a smokestack of USS Baltimore , then laid up in reserve, the Executive Office, then the Marine Barracks.
Note that Hancock 's sides, amidships and aft, have been built up for receiving ship service.

Courtesy of M.S. Brainard, 1982.

U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph.

Online Image: 57KB 740 x 465 pixels

USS Hancock (1902-1926, later AP-3)

As the receiving ship at the New York Navy Yard circa 1910, when the Connecticut -class battleship in the right distance received her two cage masts.
The original image is printed on post card stock. See Photo # NH 105913-A for a view of the reverse of this card, featuring an undated message from a Sailor to his sister, Mrs. Edgar Hallett of Dorchester (Boston), Massachusetts, concerning his service in the ship's dynamo room.
A second postcard, with an identical photograph, remains in the posession of the donor. Postmarked on Hancock on 2 December 1910, it features a message from the same Sailor to his mother, Mrs. Martha McCreedy, also of Dorchester, concerning his assignment to the ship for the next five months.

Donation of Captain Stephen S. Roberts, USNR (Retired), 2008.

U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph.

Online Image: 54KB 740 x 470 pixels

USS Hancock (1902-1926, later AP-3)

Photograph dated 9 March 1914.

Courtesy of Jim Kazalis, 1981.

U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph.

Online Image: 46KB 740 x 450 pixels

USS Hancock (1902-1926, later AP-3)

Docked at Vera Cruz, Mexico, 1914.
The original image is printed on post card ("AZO") stock.
The reverse of the original card is inscribed, in ink: "The home of the First Advance Base Regt. U.S. Marine Corps".

Donation of Charles R. Haberlein Jr., 2009.

U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph.

Online Image: 111KB 900 x 580 pixels

USS Hancock (1902-1926, later AP-3)

"In action", circa 1914-1917.
She appears to be firing salutes in this photo, which was copyrighted by N. Moser, New York, and printed on post card ("AZO") stock.
Note the heavily retouched bow wave streaming away from the "thousand-ton" destroyer partially visible at right.

Donation of Charles R. Haberlein Jr., 2008.

U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph.

Online Image: 86KB 740 x 465 pixels

USS Hancock (1902-1926, later AP-3)

At the Philadelphia Navy Yard, Pennsylvania, 1915-1916.

Collection of Lieutenant Commander Abraham DeSomer, donated by Myles DeSomer, 1975.

U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph.

Online Image: 75KB 740 x 575 pixels

USS Hancock (1902-1926, later AP-3)

In harbor with Marines crowding her decks, circa 1916.

Collection of Eugene Bennett, donated by his daughter, Jene B. Hart, September 1988.


Flame gun n.

This was the crew of Yultats who were busily engaged in erecting a monster flame-gun in a balcony just above Starr’s head.

The first wave of attack came hurtling, baying like hounds on their trail. He caught them unawares. His flame gun spouted a long streamer of gas. The inflammable gas united explosively with the oxygen of the air, spread a wide sheet of flame over the oncoming men. There was a howl of pain, suddenly hushed screams, and half a dozen crisped bodies tumbled awkwardly to the rock. The rest recoiled hastily.

The lips of the man hardened. His hand jerked swiftly to his belt, and now his own flame gun spat a crackling emanation. Others were following his lead. There followed several moments of hysteria, during which the liquid blobs divided and redivided, but as the flames subsided almost simultaneously from lowered weapons, a feeling of inexorable danger came over them, for numerous lesser liquid blotches were swirling forward.

His eyes narrowed into cunning slits of evil, as he loosed the flame gun in the holster by his side.

He found himself with a flame-gun in his hands. He trained it on the vines. Yellow-crimson fire leapt forward.


The history of echocardiography

Following a brief review of the development of medical ultrasonics from the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s, the collaboration between Edler and Hertz that began in Lund in 1953 is described. Using an industrial ultrasonic flaw detector, they obtained time-varying echoes transcutaneously from within the heart. The first clinical applications of M-mode echocardiography were concerned with the assessment of the mitral valve from the shapes of the corresponding waveforms. Subsequently, the various M-mode recordings were related to their anatomical origins. The method then became established as a diagnostic tool and was taken up by investigators outside Lund, initially in China, Germany, Japan and the USA and, subsequently, world-wide. The diffusion of echocardiography into clinical practice depended on the timely commercial availability of suitable equipment. The discovery of contrast echocardiography in the late 1960s further validated the technique and extended the range of applications. Two-dimensional echocardiography was first demonstrated in the late 1950s, with real-time mechanical systems and, in the early 1960s, with intracardiac probes. Transesophageal echocardiography followed, in the late 1960s. Stop-action two-dimensional echocardiography enjoyed a brief vogue in the early 1970s. It was, however, the demonstration by Bom in Rotterdam of real-time two-dimensional echocardiography using a linear transducer array that revolutionized and popularized the subject. Then, the phased array sector scanner, which had been demonstrated in the late 1960s by Somer in Utrecht, was applied to cardiac studies from the mid-1970s onwards. Satomura had demonstrated the use of the ultrasonic Doppler effect to detect tissue motion in Osaka in the mid-1950s and the technique was soon afterwards applied in the heart, often in combination with M-mode recording. The development of the pulsed Doppler method in the late 1960s opened up new opportunities for clinical innovation. The review ends with a mention of color Doppler echocardiography. (E-mail:


Hope, Through History C13Originals

Welcome to Hope, Through History, with Pulitzer Prize Winning and Best Selling Author and Historian, Jon Meacham and directed and produced by Cadence13, in partnership with The HISTORY® Channel. HTH explores some of the most historic and trying times in American History, and how this nation dealt with these moments, the impact of these moments and how we came through these moments a unified nation. Season One takes a look at critical moments around the 1918 Flu Pandemic, the Great Depression, World War II, the polio epidemic and the Cuban Missile Crisis. These stories of crisis—the term originates in the writings of Hippocrates, as a moment in the course of a disease where a patient either lives or dies—are rich, and in our own 2020 hour of pandemic and slow-motion but indisputably real panic, there’s utility in re-engaging with the stories of how leaders and citizens have reacted amid tension and tumult. The vicissitudes of history always challenge us in new and often-confounding ways that’s in the nature of things. Still, as Winston Churchill once remarked, “The future is unknowable, but the past should give us hope”—the hope that human ingenuity, reason, and character can combine to save us from the abyss and keep us on a path, in another phrase of Churchill’s, to broad, sun-lit uplands.


Concrete Barges (YO-144 and YOG-40 Classes): Photographs

Click on the small photograph to prompt a larger view of the same image.

Probably shown after being floated out of her building dock on 13 October 1942 by Concrete Ship Constructors.
The first concrete barge built for the U.S. government since 1920 and the lead ship of her class, she remained a Maritime Commission vessel until commissioning as USS YOG-85 in August 1943.

Photo No. None
Source: Shipscribe

Concrete Ship Constructors, National City, Calif.

The company's facilities on 9 March 1943, including Building Docks Nos. 1 and 2 and the Outfitting Dock.
The ships at the outfitting dock are YOG-41 , Concrete No.1 , YO-144 , and YOG-40 , probably in that order from left to right. Two hulls are taking shape in the building docks, of which the more advanced, YOG-42 , was floated out later in the month.

Photo No. 19-N-42143
Source: U.S. National Archives (RG-19-LCM)

Under tow in San Diego Harbor on 12 March 1943 shortly after completion by her builder, Concrete Ship Constructors.
The tugs are Narkeeta (YT-133, later YTM-133) on the left and YMT-1 (later YTL-86) on the right. The deckhouse amidships is probably a pumproom.

Photo No. 19-N-42120
Source: Arthur D. Baker III

Under tow in San Diego Harbor on 12 March 1943 shortly after completion by her builder, Concrete Ship Constructors.
The tugs are probably Wenonah (YT-148, later YTB-148) on the left and YMT-3 (later YTL-88) and a sister (either YMT-1 or YMT-12) on the right.

Photo No. 19-N-42130
Source: Arthur D. Baker III

Under tow in San Diego Harbor on 14 June 1943 shortly after completion by her builder, Concrete Ship Constructors.
The tug to starboard is probably Wenonah (YT-148, later YTB-148). The stern of Pocahontas (YT-266, later YTB-266) is barely visible to port beyond the barge's rudder.

Photo No. 19-N-47838
Source: Arthur D. Baker III

Under tow in San Diego Harbor on 14 June 1943 shortly after completion by her builder, Concrete Ship Constructors.
The tug is Pocahontas (YT-266, later YTB-266). The function of the additional deckhouse with the smokestack (absent on YO-144 ) just forward of the pumproom has not been determined, but it is not for propulsion.

Photo No. 19-N-48080
Source: Arthur D. Baker III

Under tow in San Diego Harbor on 14 June 1943 shortly after completion by her builder, Concrete Ship Constructors.
The tug is Wenonah (YT-148, later YTB-148). The original photo caption states that this barge was originally named Concrete No. 6 , but this name does not appear in other sources.

Photo No. 19-N-47837
Source: Arthur D. Baker III

Probably shown during her launching (floating out) ceremony on 16 May 1943.

Photo No. None
Source: Courtesy Tim Doyle

Shown on 29 May 1943 after being floated out of her building dock.

Photo No. None
Source: Courtesy Tim Doyle

Probably shown in commission in late May 1943.
She is fully fitted out and is flying a jack on the bow.

Photo No. None
Source: Courtesy Tim Doyle

Probably shown in commission in late May 1943.
Her massive draft is fully evident in this view.

Photo No. None
Source: Courtesy Tim Doyle

Probably shown at her launching ceremony on 6 September 1943.
The elaborate ceremony appears to involve representatives of five countries including the U.S., U.K., USSR, and Republic of China plus a band and onlookers from the workforce and the community.

Photo No. None
Source: Courtesy Tim Doyle

In service at an advance base in the Pacific with an LST alongside, probabley to receive diesel fuel.


TOLDSON v. ANDERSON TULLY CO

Lee Dell TOLDSON, Appellant, v. ANDERSON-TULLY CO. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Inc., Appellees.

No. 98-CC-00078 COA.

Decided: November 24, 1998

¶ 1. Lee Dell Toldson, the claimant, appeals the decision of the Warren County Circuit Court affirming the Workers' Compensation Commission and the administrative law judge's decision to deny Mr. Toldson workers' compensation benefits. Mr. Toldson seeks benefits for an injury to his left knee and for loss of wage-earning capacity that he asserts are the result of an on-the-job accident while he was employed with Anderson Tully Company. We find that there was substantial evidence presented upon which the administrative law judge could find that Mr. Toldson was not entitled to permanent partial disability benefits. Therefore, we affirm the ruling of the circuit court.

¶ 2. Mr. Toldson filed a petition to controvert a workers' compensation claim on August 29, 1995. Therein, Mr. Toldson claimed that he was entitled to workers' compensation benefits arising from an injury he sustained in an admittedly compensable on-the-job injury. Anderson Tully Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the employer and carrier, filed an answer on September 13, 1995, admitting that Mr. Toldson sustained an injury to his right knee.

¶ 3. On September 27, 1995, Mr. Toldson filed an amended petition to controvert alleging that on April 13, 1995, he also injured his left knee. The employer and carrier answered the amended petition to controvert disputing an on-the-job injury to left knee.

¶ 4. Mr. Toldson, a dry slip puller with Anderson Tully, was involved in an on-the-job accident when a board came off a table and hit him in the right leg on April 13, 1995. Mr. Toldson initially testified that he reported his accident and injury of both knees to Todd Wilson, his supervisor. He also stated that he did not mention the left knee injury to Dr. Easterling, whom he saw on April 17, 1995, because his right knee hurt more. At one point, Mr. Toldson testified that he experienced pain in his left knee and that he mentioned pain in both knees to Dr. Daniel Dare, the orthopedic surgeon who performed surgery on both of his knees in 1995. However, during later testimony and upon cross-examination, Mr. Toldson admitted that he only reported an injury to his right knee to his supervisor and treating physicians.

¶ 5. After examining Mr. Toldson, Dr. Dare stated that he diagnosed Mr. Toldson with an osteochondral injury to the medial femoral condyle and recommended and performed arthroscopic surgery on his right knee. Thereafter, he put Mr. Toldson in a rehabilitation program. In November 1995, Dr. Dare stated that Mr. Toldson reached maximum medical recovery with a 15% permanent partial impairment rating translating into a fifty (50%) percent loss of industrial use to his right knee.

¶ 6. Dr. Dare testified that the first complaint he ever received from the claimant about a left knee injury was in October 1995. Mr. Toldson scheduled an appointment to have his left knee evaluated in November 1995. During that visit, Mr. Toldson told Dr. Dare that he injured both knees in the April 1995 workplace accident. Although Dr. Dare informed Mr. Toldson that his left knee injury was not at that time considered under workers' compensation, he scheduled Mr. Toldson for surgery in late November and performed the same for his left knee. Dr. Dare stated that if the patient's history was truthful, then it was likely that the same accident caused both injuries. However, after Dr. Dare reviewed Mr. Toldson's medical history, he identified conflicting claims about the origin of his injuries. Dr. Dare opined that the medical history taken closer to the time of the accident was probably more reliable. Dr. Dare further testified that it was unusual for a patient to have a condition present and go for any length of time without comment or complaint especially when he was being treated for a similar problem. Dr. Dare also stated that the left knee injury was likely the result of twisting type accident.

¶ 7. A year after Mr. Toldson's injury, he was seen and evaluated by Dr. Van Temple, an orthopedist. Dr. Temple testified that it was not only inconsistent, but improbable that if both knees were injured in the same occurrence that one knee would become symptomatic much later in time than the other one. Dr. Temple also agreed that it was improbable that Mr. Toldson's left knee injury would go unnoticed for any length of time and that it was likely the result of a twisting type accident.

¶ 8. Mr. Toldson testified that he had not worked full time since his accident of April 13, 1995. However, when asked where and when he sought employment, Mr. Toldson only gave vague answers.

¶ 9. A hearing was held on a motion for immediate medical treatment for Mr. Toldson's left knee injury. Mr. Toldson was the only witness at this hearing. The administrative law judge held the motion in abeyance until the hearing on the merits. At the hearing on the merits held on August 30, 1996, the administrative law judge entered an order determining Mr. Toldson sustained a fifty percent (50%) industrial loss of use of the right lower extremity and was entitled to be compensated for temporary total disability from June 6, 1995 through November 29, 1995 at the rate of $221.61 a week. Additionally, Mr. Toldson received permanent partial disability benefits in the amount of $221.61 a week for eighty-seven and one-half (87.5) weeks based on the finding that he had a fifty percent (50%) industrial loss of use of the right lower extremity. Furthermore, the administrative law judge denied Mr. Toldson's motion for immediate medical treatment for his left lower extremity. Thereafter, the Full Commission affirmed the administrative law judge's order in toto. The Warren County Circuit Court affirmed the Full Commission's decision, and this appeal was taken.

¶ 10. Appellate review of workers' compensation claims is a narrow one. The standard of review utilized by this Court when considering an appeal of a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission is well settled. The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he findings and order of the Workers' Compensation Commission are binding on this Court so long as they are ‘supported by substantial evidence.’ ” Vance v. Twin River Homes, Inc., 641 So.2d 1176, 1180 (Miss.1994) (quoting Fought v. Stuart C. Irby Co., 523 So.2d 314, 317 (Miss.1988)). As stated in Delta CMI v. Speck, 586 So.2d 768, 772-73 (Miss.1991):

Under settled precedent, courts may not hear evidence in compensation cases. Rather, their scope of review is limited to a determination of whether or not the decision of the commission is supported by the substantial evidence. If so, the decision of the commission should be upheld. The circuit courts act as intermediate courts of appeal. The Supreme Court, as the circuit courts, acts as a court of review and is prohibited from hearing evidence or otherwise evaluating evidence and determining facts ․ “[W]hile appeals to the Supreme Court are technically from the decision of the Circuit Court, the decision of the commission is that which is actually under review for all practical purposes.”

As stated, the substantial evidence rule serves as the basis for appellate review of the commission's order. Indeed, the substantial evidence rule in workers' compensation cases is well established in our law. Substantial evidence, though not easily defined, means something more than a “mere scintilla” of evidence, and that it does not rise to the level of “a preponderance of the evidence.” It may be said that it “means such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Substantial evidence means evidence which is substantial, that is, affording a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.”

¶ 11. Claimant bears the general burden of proof of establishing every essential element of the claim, and it is not sufficient to leave the matter to surmise, conjecture, or speculation. Fought, 523 So.2d at 317 Flintkote Co. v. Jackson, 192 So.2d 395, 397 (Miss.1966) Narkeeta, Inc. v. McCoy, 247 Miss. 65, 69, 153 So.2d 798, 800 (1963) V. Dunn, mississippi Workers' Compensation, § 265 (3d ed.1982).

¶ 12. The claimant, as a general proposition, has the burden of proof. He must meet this burden by showing an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment and a causal connection between the injury and the claimed disability.

Narkeeta, 247 Miss. at 69, 153 So.2d at 800. Claimant also has the burden of showing that he sought but was unable to obtain work in similar or other jobs. Barnes v. Jones Lumber, 637 So.2d 867, 869-70 (Miss.1994).

¶ 13. This Court considers the essential components of a compensation case as stated in Penrod Drilling Co. v. Etheridge, 487 So.2d 1330 (Miss.1986):

1. The claimant generally bears the burden of proof to show an injury arising out of employment, and a causal connection between the injury and the claimed disability

2. The Commission is the trier of facts, judges the credibility of witnesses, and facts supported by substantial evidence should be affirmed by the circuit court

3. Unless prejudicial error is found, or the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence the Commission's order should be affirmed.

Id. at 1332 (citing Strickland v. M.H. McMath Gin, Inc., 457 So.2d 925, 928 (Miss.1984)).

¶ 14. This Court will reverse only where a Commission order is clearly erroneous and contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Id. see also Hedge v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 641 So.2d 9, 12 (Miss.1994). We are not permitted to re-weigh the evidence to determine where, in our opinion, the preponderance of the evidence lies. Lanterman v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 608 So.2d 1340, 1345 (Miss.1992). Moreover, “[t]his Court will overturn a Commission decision only for an error of law, or an unsupportable finding of fact.” Georgia Pacific Corp. v. Taplin, 586 So.2d 823, 826 (Miss.1991) (citations omitted). Therefore, this Court will not overturn a Commission decision unless it finds that the Commission's decision was arbitrary and capricious. Id. see also Walker Mfg. Co. v. Cantrell, 577 So.2d 1243, 1247 (Miss.1991) (finding that where court finds credible evidence supporting Commission decision, it cannot interfere with that decision any more than with cases from other administrative bodies). Therefore, we must examine the record and be satisfied that substantial evidence existed upon which the Commission could base its decision.

¶ 15. After careful review of the record, we have concluded that substantial evidence existed to warrant the Full Commission's decision to deny Mr. Toldson additional benefits. Under the principles of Flintkote, Mr. Toldson bears the burden to prove the essential elements of his claim by competent, credible evidence which is beyond speculation and conjecture. Mr. Toldson waited nearly four months before he claimed that his left knee was also injured in the accident that caused the injury to his right knee. After Mr. Toldson's testimony, the employer and carrier presented substantial evidence to support a finding that Mr. Toldson was not entitled to additional benefits for his left knee injury including testimony by two orthopedists Dr. Daniel Dare and Dr. Van Temple.

¶ 16. Under Narkeeta, Mr. Toldson had to prove that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. Both doctors testified that it was unlikely that his left knee injury occurred after the April 13, 1995 accident. However, both doctors also stated in their depositions, and the Full Commission agreed, that if both of his knees were injured in the same accident that it is improbable that Mr. Toldson would have waited to report the left knee injury. Additionally, Mr. Toldson testified that he had tried to seek other employment although he was unclear where and when he applied for employment. Since the order of the Workers' Compensation Commission is supported by findings of fact and is not clearly erroneous nor contrary to the weight of credible evidence, this Court will affirm the circuit court's decision affirming the Full Commission's order denying Mr. Toldson additional benefits.

¶ 17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WARREN COUNTY IS AFFIRMED AND COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE TAXED TO THE APPELLANT.


Narkeeta, MS

Narkeeta was located between Porterville and Ennondale on the M&O railroad, presently under another title, north of the Sucarnochee creek. Seems this town started developing in the mid to late 1800's and became a busy place but had difficulty growing because of the location and the economy.

I have a map of the old town that locates several buildings and businesses, the railroad, and Masonic hall. There was a rail spur that was planned and partially completed, that ran from Gainsville, Alabama to Narkeeta and connected with the M&O. From information gathered, the town more or less became vacant in the depression (1920) as people moved away. One person I talked with said he was working with the railroad when the last mail was delivered there in 1925. Since he and I spoke two years ago, he has passed in death.

There are several old foundations made of cement still on the site but unfortunately the land has become privately owned and permission is not granted to go there. This is in part why I have stopped my research and exploring on site. I am sure there are more avenues to research but as time passes, information is more difficult to obtain.

This isn't much information but shared in hopes that some one else may read this and add to it.
Regards,
David Easterling

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If you have questions or problems with this site, email the County Coordinator, Marsha Bryant. Please to not ask for specfic research on your family. I am unable to do your personal research. I do not live in MS and do not have access to additional records.


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